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A Faculty Column By Russell Gentry and Craig Zimring |
TECHNOLOGISTS THROUGHOUT OUR SOCIETY are considering ways of addressing the recent acts of terrorism in the United States. In our profession, architects and engineers wonder how the recent events will change the way we design buildings and how the public will perceive our buildings. What will our response be?
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Should we change the way buildings are designed and constructed in response to these new threats? If so, then what discussion needs to begin now, so we make these changes in a rational manner – with a clear understanding of the tradeoffs we face as we begin to design and construct for greater security?
Many of us in building science research are puzzled that the response from our research community is barely noticeable. The public health community has responded vigorously to the recent bioterrorism attacks. The aviation industry is actively developing and implementing new technologies for ensuring the safety of airline travelers. The building design community seems more interested in discussing the plan for the re-development of lower Manhattan, instead of wondering whether all buildings need to be designed (or redesigned) in light of new threats and new modes of attack.
Three realities must be addressed as we push for a serious consideration of building security as part of the design process.
First, we must acknowledge that the building industry is fractured and diffuse, with no federal oversight or central source for building policy. There is no building science equivalent to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Building "policy" is simply not set at a national level. Rather, buildings are shaped by codes and standards developed by consensus bodies that include building inspectors, architects, engineers and constructors. Code bodies like the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and the International Congress of Building Officials (ICBO) do not really involve themselves with building policy. Rather, they react to trends in the industry, to the development of new materials and to new modes of construction, and subsequently adapt their codes to include these new technologies where market forces or building research dictate.
A second problem is the level of and sources for funding building science research. The research community of which Georgia Tech is a part has organized itself to compete for federally funded research. There is no federal agency that funds research about "buildings." Thus, there is little focus on building research. It is true that the National Science Foundation (NSF) funds research about specific building systems (e.g., structural, mechanical), and many of us have received grants from the NSF Civil and Mechanical Systems Division. NSF does not fund research in architecture because it is not a science, nor is it engineering. Nevertheless, the profession of architecture oversees the design and delivery of all of the commercial and many of the residential buildings in our country.
This leads to the third problem – the application of research knowledge in the building design community. Building designs are completed in teams led by architects, and include engineering consultants who specialize in the design of building foundations, site works, structures and mechanical systems. Designs are bounded by building code requirements that dictate egress requirements, structural capacity, fire protection and energy efficiency. Do the codes therefore contain the "embodied knowledge" of the profession? In fact, codes do not contain the kernel of knowledge necessary to design buildings. Design knowledge comes from analysis of building precedent – a reflection on and critique of existing buildings, from the study of client needs and subsequent building programming, and from the professional training that architects receive as a condition for licensure. Knowledge on how to design for building security is missing – it is not contained in the embodied knowledge of our profession and is, subsequently, missing from codes as well.
And so, there are no building codes that focus on security. No provisions exist that say: "If anthrax is a credible threat, supply HEPA filtration at all building entries and mail sorting rooms, with a minimum air exchange rate of 25 room volumes per hour" or "if a package bomb is a credible threat, then the primary public entry of the building shall be hardened for blast resistance and bomb blast within this entry shall be vented externally to the building." It may appear easy to add such provisions to existing codes, but a number of key questions are raised by these two simple examples. What is a credible threat? Can HEPA filtration reliably remove anthrax spores? Can we detect the presence of anthrax on the HEPA filters using biosensors? What is the blast pressure profile from a package bomb? What is the best location for a bomb-screening device so it will injure the fewest people if a bomb explodes at the point of detection?
A key problem in this scenario is that few research scientists focus on the application of their science to buildings. Once again we point to the lack of federal funding and the lack of a national policy, which emphasizes that architectural, engineering and science research should develop technologies that can be used to make buildings safer.
One approach to focusing the power of science and the problem solving of engineering to the question of building security is to develop a science of building vulnerability – a cross-disciplinary endeavor that relies on basic science, understands building operations and respects the design process. Basic research carried out under the umbrella of building vulnerability science would explore the transport of mists and particulates, the response of building materials to high impulse loading and the reaction of people within their environments in time of distress. Applied research in building vulnerability would develop better air filtration systems, new glazing materials to better withstand blast pressures and automated building systems to provide context-specific guidance to building occupants during an emergency.
Research carried out in the name of building vulnerability science must understand and be guided by the building design profession. Architects are already met with an immense range of technical challenges, client desires and cost constraints. Some client desires as voiced cannot be satisfied, and architects are required to confront and negotiate major design decisions that effect building security. For example, federal government guidelines suggest that buildings deemed to be at significant risk for terrorist attack should have 100-foot setbacks from any public street. The federal government has, at the same time, made a policy commitment to locating new courthouses and federal office buildings in city centers, where block sizes and existing buildings extend to within 10 feet of most sidewalks. How do we satisfy both desires? Does one take precedence? Is the 100-foot setback a prescriptive requirement that reflects on the lack of "science" in building design?
Fundamental questions about building vulnerability exist at the basic science and at the applied levels. Faculty in the College of Architecture at Georgia Tech are involved in research, sponsored by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), that characterizes the performance of building systems, provides tools for performance-based decision making about building design, and observes human reactions to buildings and their contents. We are proposing an initiative to create a national focus on building vulnerability science and look forward to helping create the knowledge base that will give the building design profession the tools necessary to design for building security.
Russell Gentry is a structural engineer and an associate professor of architecture at Georgia Tech. Craig Zimring is an environmental psychologist and professor of architecture at Georgia Tech.
How do we answer these questions? The science of risk analysis can begin to explain the concept of "credible threat" to architects and building owners. It is they who will have to decide what is credible and what is not. Aerosol scientists can further our knowledge of filtration, and biologists can explore the creation of "sensors on a chip" to detect biological agents (see article on CERTIP). Psychologists who study human movement through space can provide guidelines for the routing of people and material in buildings, so the introduction of an explosive into a building will inflict the least harm to its occupants.
For more information, contact Russell Gentry, College of Architecture, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, GA 30332-0155. (Telephone: 404-894-3845) (E-mail: russell.gentry@arch.gatech.edu); or Craig Zimring, same address. (Telephone: 404-894-3915) (E-mail: craig.zimring@arch.gatech.edu).
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Last updated: Feb. 9, 2002